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Two-person bargaining problem is considered as to allocate a number of goods between 
two players. This paper suggests that any non-trivial division of goods cause a non-zero 
change on the solution of bargaining. So, a axiom of sharing division is presented, as an 
alternative axiom to Nash’s axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives and 
Kalai-Smorodinsky’s axiom of monotonicity. This solution is targeted at the partialities of 
Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solution on some specific issues, but not to say it is better 
than others.  
Introduction 
This article discusses only the bargaining problems to allocate some goods between 
two players, the value of goods for the two players may be different. Goods are 
denoted by Xk{vk,1,vk,2}, Xk is the name of the goods, and vk,1, vk,2 are the value of Xk 
for player1 and 2. In this article, the disagreement point is always (0,0), so the goods 
sequence Xk{vk,1,vk,2} can independently represent the bargaining. θ(X)=v1/v2 is called 
the value ratio of X. If Xk{vk,1,vk,2} can be divide into two parts, X
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which simultaneously means θ(Xik)≠θ(Xk), it is called a non-trivial division, otherwise 
it is called trivial division. After a non-trivial division, we get a new bargaining issue.  
As the name has nothing to do with the allocation results, when we refer to N goods 
Xk{vk,1,vk,2}, the value ratio is always assumed in descending order. Then the upper 
right boundary of the utility sets is just the plotlines connecting the points 
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୬ାଵ ). It has a little difference with the Pareto boundary, but we still call 
it Pareto boundary, since it will not cause any misunderstanding in this paper. 
Since the correspondence between goods set and his Pareto set boundary, we can 
also call any segment in the plotline (Pareto boundary) as goods. If a point x is just a 
node of the plotlines, the value ratio of the left(right) segment is called left(right) 
value ratio of this point, and respectively denoted by θ-(x) and θ+(x). If the point is 
inside a segment, the left value ratio equals to the right value ratio, denoted by θ(x).    
Axiomatic definition 
The so-called bargaining solutions are all based on some axioms, so we can say that 
the solution is defined on the bargaining problems. The most famous axiom system is 
given by Nash, It consists of the following four axioms[1]. 
Axiom of Pareto optimality: Solution of bargaining is on the Pareto boundary. 
Axiom of symmetry: Exchange the position of two participants does not affect the 
solution. 
Axiom of invariance with respect to affine transformations of utility: Affine 
transformation on the feasible utility set (including the disagreement point) does not 
affect the solution. 
The fourth axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives is Nash's the most 
legendary axiom, and is also the most controversial one. If we denote a bargaining 
problem as a pair (α,S), in which  α  is the disagreement point, and S is the 
feasible utility set, and f(α,S) is the solution on the Pareto boundary, the axiom 
described as;  
Axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives: if (α ,S) and ( α ,T) are two 
bargaining, S⊂T, f(α,T)∈S, then f(α,S) =f(α,T). 
This solution can be simply explained as the point (x,y) on Pareto boundary, at where, 
(x-α1)( y-α2) gets its maximum, α=(α1,α2). Nash solution has also a very intuitive 
geometric interpretation, see figure1.1. It happens to be the intersection of the 
Pareto boundary and the hyperbola, which centered at α and the intersection is one 
and only one point, see figure 1.1, point N. If the Pareto boundary is y=h(x), and Nash 
solution is (a,h(a)), then the Nash value ratio of this point is defined as θN=-h’(a).  
Kalai-Smorodinsky questioned Nash’s solution by very simple example (see figure1.2). 
Let B0 denotes the bargaining G1{75,25}, G2{25,75}, B1 denotes G3{100,33.3}, 
G4{0,66.7} and B2 denotes G5{100,30}, G6{0,70}, see figure1.2. The Nash solutions of 
B0, B1 and B2 are respectively (75,75), (100,66.6) and (100,70). Kalai-Smorodinsky 
raised a sharper question.  
 
Figure1.1-3: 1. The sketch map of Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions. 2. The sketch map 
of B0, B1 and B2. 3. The sketch map of B4. 
They asked that if the player1 get same income in B0 and B2, the player2 should get 
more in B2 than in B0, similarly, player1 should get more too if the player1 get same 
income in B0 and B2. So both player1 and player2 have a good reason to demand 
more in Bଶthan in B0. And in B1, at least no one will reduce income compare to B0. 
Both Nash solutions of B1 and B2 do not satisfy these demands, see figure 1.2, the 
Nash solution of B0, B1 and B2 are marked as N0, N1 and N2. So they suggested an 
alternative axiom for Nash’s axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives[2]. 
Kalai-Smorodinsky axiom of monotonicity: if (α,S) and (α,T) are two bargaining, their 
Pareto boundary denoted as y=g1(x) and y=g2(x), Max(x:(x,y)∊S)=Max(x,y∊T)), and 
g2(x)≧g1(x), then for the solutions (a,g1(a)) and (b,g2(b)) of this two bargaining, we 
have g2(b) ≧g1(a).  
Like Nash solution, Kalai-Smorodinsky solution has also its geometry interpretation. If 
R is the smallest rectangle frame S, β is R’s upper right corner, the solution of 
bargaining (α,S) is just the intersection point of the Pareto boundary and the straight 
line connecting β and α(see figure1.2, the three K-S solution points K0, K1 and K2). 
Let us return to the bargaining B0, θ
- and θN are the left value ratio and Nash value 
ratio of (75,75), if G2{25,75} can be divided into G7{0,p} and G8{25,75-p}, we get a 
new bargaining B4. The change process of Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions with p 
are described in table1. When p>66.7, the segment G8 will move to the most left of 
Pareto boundary, see figure 1.3. 
Table 1. The change process of Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions with p, P=(100.p). 
Value of p 0 to 50 50 to 60 60 to 66.6 66.6 to 75 
N solution unchanged move to P P P 
K-S solution unchanged unchanged unchanged Pareto improved 
The value ratio of G8 θ(G8)< θ
N θN<θ(G8)< 0.6 0.6<θ(G8)< θ
- θ-<θ(G8)< +∞ 
That is to say, for any division on the right of the solution, only when this division  
created a new segment G with θ(G)>θ-, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution get a Pareto 
improvement, otherwise, the solution is unchanged. Correspondingly, If θ(G)>θN, the 
income of player1 is improved in the Nash solution, but the new Nash solution may 
not be a Pareto improvement. This is the essence of the differences between Nash 
and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions.  
We cannot imagine a player would have no interest when facing a profitable division. 
So, this paper suggests that a non-trivial division must bring some player some 
benefit. This idea comes from the foregoing formula 1. We can do a simple reverse 
reasoning. Before the division, the bargaining have a solution, after a new division, 
there must be a new segment, the value for a player increased, so this player will 
hope to benefit from this division. So the author proposed a new axiom.  
Axiom of sharing division: if Xk{vk,1,vk,2} is a bargaining, y=g(x) the Pareto boundary. 
(a,g(a)) is the solution of the bargaining under certain rule D, then the rule D can be 
described as: if a non-trivial division occurs on the right(left) of (a,g(a)), and if the 
new solution of the new bargaining on the new Pareto boundary y=g1(x) is (b,g1(b)), 
then b>a(g1(b)>g(a)).  
The most intuitive meaning of this axiom is that, for any non-trivial split, at least one 
player will get benefits from it. So every player should not miss any possibility of 
profitable division, while trying to cover up the harmful possibilities.  
This paper presents a solution to the Axiom of sharing division, it also satisfies the 
first three axioms. Y=g(x) is the Pareto boundary of a bargaining, if (a,g(a)) is the 
solution of this bargaining, and u=max(x), then it should satisfy 
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Let us return to the bargaining B4, we can see the difference among the three 
solutions. Figure 2.1-3 identified the three solutions in the case of p = 50, p=66.6 and 
p=75. In each figure, the two shaded area are equal, That is to say they satisfy the 
integral equation 
 
Figure2.1-3. comparison sketch maps for the three kinds of solutions. 
Discussion and conjecture  
The integral equation solution obviously satisfies the axiom of sharing division. This 
article conjectured that it is the unique solution to meet the axiom of sharing division. 
But authors have not got a strict proof. If it is not the unique solution, we need to 
find some more axioms to limit it.  
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